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    Bridging the    
    Cold Divide 
 
Dai Tan, J.D.∗ 
I.  Introduction 
In the East China Sea, a contested group of uninhabited islands lies at the 
confluence of several trends which characterize modern Sino-Japanese relations – 
strong regional rivalries, unresolved historical legacies, and booming economic 
relations.  The islands are known in Chinese as the “Diaoyu Tai,” and in Japanese 
as the “Senkaku” Islands.1  Although the islands themselves are of little intrinsic 
economic value, Sino-Japanese relations have increasingly become heated 
regarding ownership of the islands following a 1968 US Naval Oceanographic 
Office survey that concluded the seabed underneath the islands may possess large 
oil and gas reserves.2 
This paper will first examine the geographical characteristics of the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the context of the 1982 United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (hereinafter referred to as UNCLOS III), which China and 
Japan both signed in 1996.3  Although it is unlikely that either China or Japan will 
 
∗J.D., Santa Clara University School of Law, May 2006. 
 
 1. The islands are spelled Diaoyu Tai according to Pinyin romanization, but are alternatively 
called the Tiao Yu Tai in the older Wade-Giles transliteration system. 
 2. UNRYU SUGANAMU, REVIEW OF SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND TERRITORIAL SPACE IN SINO-
JAPANESE RELATIONS: IRREDENTISM AND THE DIAOYU/SENKAKU ISLANDS 129 (2000). 
 3. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, 
reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 [hereinafter UNCLOS III]. 
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resolve the matter by resorting to an international court, international law may still 
influence the resolution of the dispute.  The United Nations has said it will decide 
on global offshore territorial claims by May 2009.  However, before this time, both 
countries may find it prudent to reach some degree of mutual understanding, and to 
protect some of their interests should the UN fail to reach a decision in accordance 
with their claims.  Next, the paper will examine important political and economic 
issues that affect the future resolution of the dispute.  Within this context, the paper 
will examine and critique the grounds for both Chinese and Japanese claims 
regarding the islands, highlighting their particular problems and ambiguities.4  This 
will then be followed by a discussion of similar territorial problems facing the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the 2002 Declaration of 
Conduct of Parties in the South China which was set up to address such problems.5  
The paper concludes that due to problems underlying both their claims, and in the 
context of economic and political concerns, China and Japan should examine the 
possibility of either creating a bilateral agreement similar in nature to the 2002 
Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China, or jointly exploring and 
developing the disputed area. 
II.  Background 
A.  Geography and Article 121 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) is the 
starting point for examination of several maritime territorial issues related to the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.  UNCLOS III sets forth the criteria for several important 
issues, such as delineation of maritime borders and economic zones.  Discussions 
to promulgate UNCLOS III were convened in 1982, with close Chinese 
participation and input, although China was not satisfied with several provisions, 
such as those pertaining to the definition of the continental shelf.  Japan, by 
contrast, made no major contributions and even voted against UNCLOS III’s 
establishment of the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone.  Nonetheless, both China 
and Japan signed the convention in 1996.6 
 
 4. Although the islands are claimed by three parties, the People’s Republic of China (China), 
the Republic of China (Taiwan), and Japan, this paper will only analyze the Chinese and 
Japanese claims. 
 5. See Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, Nov. 4, 2002,  
 available at http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm. 
 6. SUGANAMU, supra note 2, at 29-32. 
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The Diaoyu/Senkakus are made up of 8 small islets that lie 120 miles northeast 
of Taiwan, 250 miles east of China, and 180 miles west of the Ryukyu Island 
Chain of Okinawa, Japan. They are all uninhabited, with an approximate total land 
area of 2.7 square miles and only one island has potable water and some 
vegetation.7  One island possesses a lighthouse, built by a Japanese right-wing 
group.8 
Exclusive Economic Zones (hereinafter referred to as EEZ) are determined by 
criteria as set forth by UNCLOS III.9  They may be based on a 200 mile extension 
from the coast, or may extend further than that if based on a longer continental 
shelf.  Japan claims the border of its EEZ lies at an equidistant point between the 
coasts of its southern prefecture of Okinawa and China, while China claims its 
EEZ extends to the edge of its continental shelf.  The islands lie in-between the 
disputed EEZs claimed by both countries.10  Sovereignty over them may 
potentially affect 125 square miles of surrounding area,11 and up to 200 billion 
cubic meters of natural case reserves.12 
Whether or not the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands will bestow an advantageous 
economic zone depends on their classification under the Regime of Islands 
pursuant to Article 121(3) of the UNCLOS III.13  Article 121(3) specifically states 
that a rock which is unable to either sustain “human habitation” or “economic life,” 
may not be used to create an EEZ or continental shelf.  If the feature is capable of 
sustaining human life, or is capable of having an economic life of its own at the 
time of the claim, then it will not fall within Article 121(3).14  The requirement of 
human habitation does not require permanent human settlement, and the 
requirement for economic life does not require that human life be sustained 
 
 7. Daniel Dzurek, The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute, Oct. 18, 1996, http://www-
ibru.dur.ac.uk/resources/docs/senkaku.html. 
 8. SUGANAMU, supra note 2, at 11-13. 
 9. See UNCLOS III, supra note 3.  Islands under UNCLOS may set the extent of territorial 
seas, contiguous zones, and EEZs.  The criteria for setting EEZs are specifically set forth in 
arts. 56-58. 
 10. See Kosuke Takahashi, Gas and Oil Rivalry in the East China Sea, ASIA TIMES (H.K.), 
Dec. 24, 2004, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/FG27Dh03.html. 
 11. Dzurek, supra note 7. 
 12. J. Sean Curtin, Stakes Rise in Japan, China Gas Dispute, ASIA TIMES (H.K.), Oct. 19, 2005, 
available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/GJ19Dh01.html. 
 13. See UNCLOS III, supra note 3.  Article 121(3) states “[r]ocks which cannot sustain human 
habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or 
continental shelf.” 
 14. See Jonathan I. Charney, Rocks That Cannot Sustain Human Habitation, 93 AM. J. INT’L. L. 
863, 868 (1999). 
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throughout an entire year.15  Since one of the islands possesses potable water, there 
may be sufficient basis for sustaining human habitation on an infrequent basis.  
Additionally, the economic life requirement may be satisfied either by the 
existence of rich fishing waters, or by the existence of oil and gas deposits.16  
Because the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands have the potential to satisfy the criteria of 
Article 121(3), China and Japan have sufficient reason to believe that possession of 
the islands will widen their respective EEZ claims to some degree.17 
B.  Contentious Politics 
At present, ties between China and Japan have frequently been described as hot 
economically and cold politically.18  Economic ties have grown to exceptional 
levels, yet their bilateral political relationship is frigid.  The legacy of World War 
II casts a pall on how Sino-Japanese relations are often viewed.  Chinese 
discontent over the perceived failure of Japan to fully address its invasion of China 
is a pervading factor in how disputes are resolved, and how each country views the 
other’s intentions.  Japan in turn has increasingly come to view China’s growth as 
both an economic opportunity and a potential military threat.  In recent years, there 
has been a dramatic downward turn in relations, and increasingly both 
governments have taken a hostile tone towards the other.  The present political 
situation is of great importance in understanding how any future resolution of the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute will, or must, be resolved. 
Following the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Japan and 
China had no direct contact until relations were normalized in 1972.  Sino-
Japanese relations were officially cemented by the five articles of the Treaty of 
Peace and Friendship, signed in 1978.19  Article One’s main points are an emphasis 
on mutual respect for sovereignty and territory, mutual non-aggression, equality 
and mutual benefit, and settling of all disputes by peaceful means and refraining 
from use or threat of force.  Article Three emphasizes development of economic 
and cultural relations.20 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 870. 
 17. This is not without a caveat.  The International Court of Justice has consistently held that 
islands, particularly small ones, do not generate full EEZs.  See infra Part V.d. 
 18. See J Sean Curtin, Submarine Puts Japan-China Ties into a Dive, ASIA TIMES (H.K.), Nov. 
17, 2004, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/FK17Dh01.html. 
 19. Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between Japan and the People’s Republic of China, P.R.C.-
Japan, Aug. 12, 1978, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-
paci/china/treaty78.html. 
 20. Id. 
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Additionally, China has interpreted the treaty to embody four major concepts.21  
The first concept is that Japanese rapprochement is based on remorse for its past 
aggression.  The second concept is Japan’s commitment to several policies: Article 
8 of the Potsdam Proclamation, recognition that the People’s Republic of China is 
the sole legal government of China, and in regards to Taiwan, an adherence to the 
one-China policy.  Third is the establishment of relations based on the treaty’s five 
principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrality, mutual 
nonaggression, noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual 
benefit, and peaceful coexistence.  The fourth term is that neither Japan nor China 
would seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Although bilateral relations were relatively amicable after re-establishment of 
diplomatic ties in 1972, one early irritant was Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro 
Nakasone’s 1985 call for a “total settlement of postwar accounts” and his official 
visit to Yasukuni Shrine, a place associated with Japan’s militarist past, and where 
several Class A war criminals are buried.22  Relations began to sour in the 1990s, 
more noticeably under the tenure of Chinese President Jiang Zemin.  A series of 
events, such at the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre, China’s nuclear tests, China’s 
increasing promotion of more patriotic education in 1990s, issues concerning 
interpretation of World War II matters such as the Rape of Nanking, comfort 
women, and whitewashing of Japanese textbooks began to complicate relations.23 
In recent years, increasing anti-Japanese sentiment in China has come to present 
a potential problem in that it may severely restrict what compromises are deemed 
acceptable.  A series of recent anti-Japanese events demonstrate that this sentiment 
simmers beneath the surface of Chinese perceptions of Japan, remaining 
unpredictable.  In April of 2005, unprecedented anti-Japanese riots occurred 
throughout China, in reaction to Japan having approved a controversial junior-high 
 
 21. See Wang Yi, Trends in Sino-Japanese Relations and the Challenges Ahead for Asia,  
 ISD ELECTRONIC J., May 1998, 
http://www.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/isd/files/wangcon.htm. 
 22. The Yasukuni Shrine was built in 1869 to commemorate Japan’s war dead beginning from 
1853 to1945.  Its primary controversy is the fact that 14 Class A war criminals were buried 
there in secret in 1978.  For basic information, see CNN.com, Where War Criminals Are 
Venerated, Jan. 14, 2003, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/08/13/japan.shrine.  It has had historic 
ties to Japan’s ultra-nationalists, and is still associated with such groups.  The shrine has its 
own website, Yasukuni Shrine Home Page, http://www.yasukuni.or.jp/english/index.html 
(last visited Dec. 10, 2006). 
 23. See Tomoyuki Kojima, Both Sides to Blame for Cool Japan-China Ties, ASAHI SHIMBUN 
ENGLISH EDITION (Japan), Oct. 28, 2004, available at 
http://www.asahi.com/english/opinion/TKY200410280138.html. 
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history textbook, which sparsely addressed Japan’s brutality in World War II.  
Protestors targeted anything associated with Japan, and at times were violent.24  
Such sentiment also boiled to the surface during the summer of 2004, during the 
soccer Asia Cup in China, when the Japanese soccer team was the object of 
protests, harassment, and violence.  A year before, in 2003, huge riots in the 
northwestern city of Xi’an followed a gaudy Japanese student skit misinterpreted 
as being anti-Chinese; these riots also indicated widespread anti-Japanese 
sentiment among China’s youth.25  Some have attributed rising anti-Japanese 
sentiment to China’s system of patriotic education, which allegedly emphasizes 
Japan’s crimes in World War II, as well as Chinese media bias, which focuses 
almost exclusively on negative stories concerning Japan.26 
Japan’s greatest contribution to the downward spiral of Sino-Japanese relations 
began when the government of Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi took power in 
2001.  A major problem has been his repeated visits to the controversial Yasukuni 
shrine, where fourteen Class A war criminals are enshrined.  The shrine allegedly 
whitewashes Japan’s wartime brutality.  In Japan, the constitutional legality of his 
visits has been contested with mixed results.27  China has increasingly made it 
clear that such visits are a major impediment to improving bilateral relations, going 
so far as to suspend a traditional trilateral meeting between China, Japan, and 
South Korea.28  Denial of Japan’s crimes during World War II by ultranationalist 
groups, such as the refusal to acknowledge the Rape of Nanking, has deeply 
affected bilateral relations and provided fuel to Chinese resentment.29 
Within this context of simmering bilateral tensions, the dispute over the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands has been a feature of more recent controversies.  On 
February 9, 2005, Japan placed control over a lighthouse built on one of the islands 
under its Coast Guard.30  Months before, a Chinese nuclear submarine was 
 
 24. The Observer, Violence Flares as the Chinese Rage at Japan, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.),  
 Apr. 17, 2005, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/china/story/0,7369,1461761,00.html. 
 25. See J. Sean Curtin, Japan 3, China 1 - But Both Are Losers, ASIA TIMES (H.K.), Aug. 10, 
2004, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/FH10Dh01.html. 
 26. See Kojima, supra note 23. 
 27. Editorial, Winning Doesn’t Make Him Right, JAPAN TIMES (Japan), Oct. 3, 2005, available 
at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-in/ed20051003a1.html. 
 28. Frank Ching, Sino-Japanese Strains Bode Ill for EAS, JAPAN TIMES (Japan), Dec. 26, 2005, 
available at  http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20051226fc.html. 
 29. Fury at Nanking “Lie” Claim, BBC NEWS (U.K.), July 13, 2003, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3062141.stm. 
 30. Robert Marquand, Japan-China Tensions Rise Over Tiny Islands, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Feb. 11, 2005, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0211/p01s03-
woap.html. 
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suspected to have intruded into Japan’s territorial waters, in violation of 
international law.31  The submarine was found to be near the disputed 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, and subsequently a Japanese minister went so far as to 
link the incident to China’s natural gas exploration near the islands.32  
Additionally, a paper by Japan’s Defense Agency highlighted three possible 
scenarios for an attack on Japan by China.33  In the first scenario, Japan could 
possibly be attacked by China in a conflict between mainland China and Taiwan.  
The second scenario listed involves China seizing the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands to 
rally domestic public support if the public becomes overly hostile to Chinese 
Communist Party rule.  The third scenario involves China illegally securing its 
interests in the East China Sea if it deems that Japan has not taken appropriate 
measures over development of the area. 
For China and Japan, the past is a lens through which modern bilateral relations 
are viewed.  History plays a key role in China and Japan’s modern legal claims to 
the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, so, in proceeding to conduct legal analysis of their 
respective claims and possible solutions, the past needs to be taken into 
consideration. 
C.  Economics, Oil, and the Islands 
Sino-Japanese trade has progressed at a remarkable rate since ties were first 
established.  Bilateral trade hit a record 24.949 trillion yen in 2005, a 12.4% 
increase from 2004 figures, for the second consecutive year.34  Despite a cool 
political relationship, bilateral trade is the tie that binds the two countries together. 
China and Japan are highly dependent upon foreign oil, and scarcity along with 
rising oil prices threaten to curtail economic growth.  Both governments are also 
highly sensitive to potential sources of oil.  For example, in the third quarter of 
2004, high oil prices were partly attributed to Japan’s low industrial production 
growth of 0.1%, a 0.2% decrease from the forecasted increase of 0.3%.35  In the 
 
 31. Under Article 20 of UNCLOS, submarines are required to surface and show their flags 
when navigating in the territorial waters of another country.  UNCLOS III, supra note 3, 
art. 20.  For more information on the incident, see Curtin, supra note 18. 
 32. Japanese Minister Links Sub Intrusion with China’s Gas Project, AGENCE FR. PRESSE (Fr.), 
Nov. 13, 2004, available at 
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/117052/1/.html. 
 33. Defense Strategists Look to China's Attack Threat, JAPAN TIMES (Japan), Nov. 9, 2004, 
available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20041109f3.htm. 
 34. China Again Top Japan Trade Partner, JAPAN TIMES (Japan), Jan. 27, 2006, available at 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20060127a5.htm. 
 35. Japanese Growth Grinds to a Halt, BBC NEWS (U.K.), Nov. 12, 2005, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4005455.stm. 
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past, the global oil crisis of 1973 caused Japan’s gross domestic product to shrink 
from 5.1% growth to -0.5%.36  Demand for oil has increased tension between the 
two countries, especially since China’s fast growing economy has increasingly 
become dependent on foreign oil.  In 2004 its economy accounted for 6% of world 
consumption, and this number is forecasted to increase by more than 9% by 2020.  
To cope with rising demand for oil, it has formulated a “go-out” strategy to secure 
oil reserves, and plans to cooperate with twenty-seven countries for oil 
exploration.37  Competition between the two countries is further highlighted by 
attempts to secure an oil pipeline which will be built in Russia’s Far East, as well 
as China’s plans to become the number one importer of Iranian oil, taking Japan’s 
current place.38 
Within the context of recent economic growth, the need for oil is a key issue in 
the contentious Diaoyu/Senkaku Island dispute.  In August of 2003, China 
negotiated several contracts worth billions of dollars with oil development 
companies for exploration and production gas projects in the East China Sea.  
Recently in areas close to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, China began drilling in 
three separate undisputed areas close to Japan’s claimed EEZ.  This development 
has concerned Japan, because two of the sites are potentially connected at the 
subterranean level to gas fields located on the Japanese side of what Japan 
recognizes as its EEZ.  Japan fears that any exploitation of oil or gas reserves by 
China in its areas near this EEZ may end up siphoning off reserves from Japan’s 
side of the EEZ.39 
Worries over resource development near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands have 
worsened relations.  As Japan increasingly became worried at China’s moves to 
develop the Chunxiao gas field, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing proposed 
joint cooperation in exploring the potential reserves in the East China Sea on June 
22, 2004.  Initially Japan did not accept the offer, and instead requested that China 
provide all the details regarding its plans.  This request was not answered by 
China.40  Japan has amended its previous position and proposed joint development 
of the disputed area.  However China has only proposed joint exploration of the 
disputed area on Japan’s side of the median line, contending that its claims extend 
 
 36. Richard Giragosian, Energy Security in East Asia, INST. FOR ANALYSIS GLOBAL SECURITY, 
Aug. 13, 2004, available at http://www.iags.org/n0813042.htm. 
 37. Don Lee, China Barrels Ahead in Oil Market, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2004, available at 
http://www.energybulletin.net/3152.html. 
 38. Id. 
 39. J. Sean Curtin, Stakes Rise in Japan, China Gas Dispute, ASIA TIMES (H.K.), Oct. 19, 2005, 
available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/GJ19Dh01.html. 
 40. See Takahashi, supra note 10. 
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to the continental shelf which includes Taiwan.41  Three previous rounds of 
negotiations concerning the subject have not resulted in any breakthroughs.42  At 
present, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute involves much more than just who 
owns the islands: the dispute lies at the convergence of many other contentious 
political and economic issues. 
III.  Chinese and Japanese Claims 
A.  Facts Supporting China’s Claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
China’s claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are primarily irredentist in 
nature, and rests on a number of legal theories, which take the form of two basic 
approaches.  The first approach incorporates two traditional legal theories, prior 
discovery and use, to present a historical case for Chinese sovereignty.  The second 
approach seeks to weaken Japan’s claims by depicting two points – (1) Japan’s 
prior acknowledgement of Chinese sovereignty, and (2) cession of any Japanese 
claim to Chinese territory at the end of World War II. 
China’s primary claim rests upon the theory of occupation, based upon the legal 
theories of discovery and prior use.  Discovery is the oldest method by which 
territory is acquired.43  A state that discovers territory that is terra nullius, or land 
that does not belong to any other state, may claim the land.  This claim may be 
substantiated by evidence of prior occupation or use.  Occupation is based upon a 
physical presence coupled with continuous and peaceful display of territorial 
sovereignty over territory belonging to no state.  China asserts four bases for its 
claim of prior use.  First, China claims that various historical records demonstrate 
that the islands were used by China.  As early as 1373, the islands were used as 
navigational guides by envoys for tributary voyages to the Ryukyu Islands 
(Okinawa).44  The use of some of the islands as navigational aids by tributary 
envoys from the Ryukyu Kingdom, especially during the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries during Ming Dynasty was described in various Chinese sources.45  
Additionally, the islands were also described in records dating from around the 
eighteenth century as navigational aids used by Chinese and Ryukyu envoys 
 
 41. Mayumi Negishi, Japan Proposes Joint Use of Deposits in East China Sea Fields, JAPAN 
TIMES (Japan), Oct. 2, 2005, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/nn20051002al.html. 
 42. See Curtin, supra note 39. 
 43. GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 367, 368 (6th ed.1992). 
 44. SUGANAMU, supra note 2, at 45.  See also Dzurek, supra note 7. 
 45. Id. 
PP 134-168 TAN (AA) 12/9/2006  4:05 PM 
 The Diaoyu/Senkaku Dispute 143 
  
143
during the Qing dynasty.  Some of these Qing records suggest that the Qing 
government regarded the islands as belonging to the Qing, and not to the Ryukyu 
Kingdom.46  Second, China asserts that the islands were incorporated into Ming 
dynasty coastal defenses during the sixteenth century.47  Third, due to China’s 
inclusion of the island of Taiwan as a part of China during the Qing dynasty, use of 
the area by Taiwanese fishermen constitutes a historical use of the islands by 
China.48  Fourth, China asserts that the islands were granted by the Qing 
government to a private Chinese citizen, to be used as a source of a Chinese 
medicinal herb.  In 1893 the Qing dynasty Dowager Empress Cixi issued an 
imperial edict granting three of the islets to Sheng Xuanhuai, who collected herbs 
from the islands to treat her illness.49  Taken together, China claims these acts 
constitute an effective exercise of sovereignty. 
China’s secondary approach is based around countering Japan’s more modern 
claims to the island.  China first asserts that in the past, Japan had tacitly 
acknowledged Chinese sovereignty over the islands up until the late nineteenth 
century.  It points to Japanese maps, which do not include the islands as a part of 
the Ryukyu Kingdom, which was annexed by Japan.  In the Sangoku Tsuran 
Zusetsu, a collection of geographical maps produced by Hayashi Shihei in 1785 
during the Tokugawa Shogunate, the islands were not included as a part of the 
Ryukyu Kingdom.50  Additionally, the Japanese government issued two official 
maps in 1874 and 1877 respectively, which did not include the disputed islands.51 
China asserts that Japan only attempted to claim sovereignty over the islands in 
the lead up to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 (which ended in 1895).  In early 
1894, the Japanese Interior Minister requested that Okinawa Prefecture erect 
national markets on the islands, a request the Foreign Minister refused to do, citing 
concern for attracting China’s attention.52  After Japan’s victory in the Sino-
Japanese war of 1895, the Treaty of Shimonoseki – which concluded hostilities – 
conceded Chinese territory to Japan.  Article II, Section (b) ceded Formosa 
[Taiwan], “together with all islands appertaining or belonging to the said Island of 
 
 46. Id. at 74-81. 
 47. Id. at 62.  See also Dzurek, supra note 7. 
 48. Cheng-China Huang, ICE Case Studies: Diaoyu Islands Dispute, Dec. 1997, 
http://www.american.edu/projects/mandala/TED/ice/DIAOYU.HTM. 
 49. SUGANAMU, supra note 2, at 86-7.  See also Dzurek, supra note 7. 
 50. Id. at 88-9. 
 51. Id. at 99.  See also William B. Heflin, Diayou/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Japan and China, 
Oceans Apart, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 18 (2000). 
 52. SUGANAMU, supra note 2, at 96. 
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Formosa,” to Japan.53  China claims that the islands were ceded to Japan as a part 
of Taiwan, and contends that, taken together, these acts show that the islands were 
regarded as a part of imperial China, or were regarded as being a part of Taiwanese 
Island chain. 
China believes that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were returned to it at the end of 
World War II, and cites two treaties to prove its case: the 1951 San Francisco 
Treaty of Peace, and the 1952 Treaty of Peace signed between the Republic of 
China and Japan.  Article 2 of the 1951 San Francisco Treaty required Japan to 
renounce rights to many of its imperial territories, including Formosa (Taiwan).  A 
potential problem emerges however because neither the People’s Republic of 
China nor the Republic of China (Taiwan) was present at the signing of the San 
Francisco Treaty, and neither party signed the Treaty.54  However, the United 
States administered the islands along with the Okinawan Islands under Article 3 of 
the San Francisco Treaty and transferred them to Japan in 1971.55  While the US 
action does not change the legal sovereignty of the islands, it does bolster Japan’s 
case that the islands were considered a part of Okinawa.  China also cites the 1952 
Treaty of Peace signed between the Republic of China and Japan.  Article IV of the 
treaty states that “all treaties, special accords, agreements concluded prior before 
December 9, 1941, between Japan and China have become null and void . . . .”56  
Additionally, the 1952 Sino-Japanese treaty cites Article 2 of the 1951 San 
Francisco Peace Treaty.  However Article 2, subsections (b) and (f) of the 1951 
San Francisco Treaty only state that Japan renounces all right, title and claim to 
Formosa (Taiwan), the Pescadores, the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands.57  It 
does not specifically mention the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.  To resolve this 
 
 53. See Treaty of Shimonoseki, P.R.C.-Japan, May 8, 1895, available at 
http://www.taiwandocuments.org/shimonoseki01.htm (stating that China cedes to Japan in 
perpetuity and full sovereignty the following territory, together with all fortifications, 
arsenals, and public property thereon: (b) The island of Formosa [Taiwan], together with all 
islands appertaining or belonging to the said Island of Formosa.). 
 54. The People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, and governs mainland China.  The 
Republic of China is the official name of Taiwan.  It was formerly ruled by the 
Guomindang (KMT), which governed Mainland China, but the KMT fled to Taiwan at the 
end of the Chinese Civil War in 1948 and 1949.  Taiwan is now a democracy, although the 
People’s Republic of China considers the Republic of China a “renegade province.” 
 55. See Dzurek, supra note 7. 
 56. Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan, P.R.C.-Japan, art. IV, Apr. 28, 
1952, 138 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.taiwandocuments.org/taipei01.htm. 
 57. San Francisco Peace Treaty, art. 2, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169.  Art. 2 subsec. (b) reads, in 
relevant part, “Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.”  
Subsec. (f) reads, “Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the 
Paracel Islands.” 
PP 134-168 TAN (AA) 12/9/2006  4:05 PM 
 The Diaoyu/Senkaku Dispute 145 
  
145
problem, the historical evidence aforementioned is used by China to argue that the 
islands were included as a part of Taiwan, citing examples of Japan’s historical 
acknowledgment of China’s sovereignty over the islands as a part of imperial 
China and as a part of Taiwan. 
China’s first approach colors its claim to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 
historical terms by establishing historical discovery and prior use.  China’s second 
approach seeks to dislodge Japan’s colonial claims to the islands.  China claims 
Japan historically acknowledged that the islands were either a part of imperial 
China or Taiwan.  Due to this, the islands and Taiwan were part of the same unit, 
which was ceded to Japan via the Treaty of Shimonoseki.  A country may acquire 
another’s territory through conquest in war, which is coupled with effective 
occupation of the territory.58  Japan did so by defeating China in 1895 at the end of 
the Sino-Japanese War, and through developing Taiwan as a colony.  However, 
although Japan gained the islands through conquest and occupation, China asserts 
that Japan relinquished its sovereignty to them through two different treaties: the 
1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty and the 1952 Treaty between the Republic of 
China and Japan.  Thus, China argues that Japan cannot use the theories of cession 
and conquest to bolster its claims. 
B.  Facts Supporting Japan’s Claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands  
Unlike China, Japan’s claims to Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are relatively recent.  
Japan claims that, despite China’s claims of discovery and prior use, Japan made 
the first legal claim to the islands through various acts prior to World War II.  
From the late nineteenth century onwards, Japan exercised affirmative acts of 
sovereignty over the islands.  Only when potential oil/gas was discovered did 
China assert its ownership of the islands.  These facts underlie Japan’s claims to 
the islands through three supporting arguments.  Japan claims that the facts show it 
first exercised a claim to the islands, and therefore they belong to Japan.  Second, 
Japan claims that it treated the islands and Taiwan as separate entities.  Since it did 
not consider the islands to be a part of Taiwan, they were never returned to China 
at the end of World War II.  Lastly, because Japan effectively exercised control 
over the islands for more than a century, Japan’s legal possession has been 
established through prescription or consolidation. 
Japan’s first approach attempts to counter China’s claim of prior discovery and 
use.  According to Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan gained legal 
 
 58. SHARON D. KORMAN, THE RIGHT OF CONQUEST: THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY 
FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 112 (1996). 
PP 134-168 TAN (AA) 12/9/2006  4:05 PM 
5 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2006)  
  
146 
possession over the islands beginning in 1885 when it began to conduct various 
surveys of the islands.  Based on these surveys the Japanese government concluded 
that the islands possessed no sign of habitation or evidence of Chinese control or 
ownership.59  Concluding that the islands were terra nullius, the Cabinet made the 
decision on January 14, 1895 to erect markers on the islands to incorporate them 
into Japanese territory.60  Since this time, Japan considered the islands a part of the 
Nansei Shoto Islands, a territory of Japan.61 
Japan’s second approach claims that since the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were 
separately incorporated into the Nansei Shoto Islands, they were never a part of 
Taiwan.  Additionally, they were not a part of Taiwan or the Pescadores Islands 
ceded to Japan pursuant to Article II of the Treaty of Shimonoseki which 
concluded the Sino-Japanese War in 1895.  Thus, the islands were not covered by 
the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty which required Japan to return its imperial 
possessions after the end of World War II. 
Japan’s third approach seeks to illustrate that Japan has exercised sovereignty 
over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands for over a century, and therefore possesses them 
through the theory of prescription or consolidation.  Prescription is the acquisition 
of title through long, continued and undisturbed possession, despite a claim of 
previous ownership from another country.  It is similar in some respects to the 
theory of adverse possession, although there is no general rule to satisfy the 
necessary length of time required to perfect title.62  Likewise, consolidation 
requires proof of long use, and is similar to prescription.  After Japan proclaimed 
that the islands were a part of Japan in 1895, it points to the fact that it leased the 
islands to a private citizen, Tatsuhiro Koga, in 1896, for thirty years with charge.63  
Koga had been exploiting some of the islands’ resources, such as shells, guano, 
and feathers, since 1884.  He subsequently invested large amounts of capital into 
developing the islands.  His diverse activities included the building of houses, 
reservoirs, wharves, piers, drainage systems, and the planting of trees.  During this 
period, Japanese immigrated to the islands and the total population reached its 
peak in 1909 with 99 families and a total of 248 people.  After he died in 1918, his 
son Zenji Koga carried on the business until he gained title after expiration of the 
 
 59. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, The Basic View on the Sovereignty Over the 
Senkaku Islands, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/senkaku.html (last visited 
Dec. 10, 2006) [hereinafter Sovereignty Over Senkaku]. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. LASSA OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 706 (Robert Y. Jennings & 
Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992). 
 63. SUGANAMU, supra note 2, at 96-8, 118-19. 
PP 134-168 TAN (AA) 12/9/2006  4:05 PM 
 The Diaoyu/Senkaku Dispute 147 
  
147
lease in 1926.  In 1932, the islands became private property when Zenji Koga 
purchased four of the islands of the Diaoyu/Senkaku group from the Japanese 
government.64  The business was discontinued in the beginning of World War II.  
After the war, and beginning in 1958, the American Civil Administration of the 
Ryukyu Islands entered into a Basic Leasing Contract with Zenji Koga for military 
use of the islands.65  Various other minor events concerning the islands occurred 
prior to and during World War II such as land surveys by various Japanese 
government agencies.66  The United States administered the islands along with the 
Okinawan Islands under Article 3 of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty.67  In 
1971, the United States transferred the islands to Japanese administration.  Since 
then Japan has continued to exercise sovereignty over the islands with its Self-
Defenses forces, regularly patrolling the area.68  Under the theory of prescription, 
title arises from the acquiescence of the dispossessed state, and emphatic protests 
from it will disrupt the prescriptive claim.69  Japan points out that China did not 
express any official objections or reservations about Japan’s actions concerning the 
islands prior to, during and after World War II, nor did China object to the United 
States administration of them.  Japan alleges that only when the potential for 
oil/gas in the vicinity of the islands was discovered in the late sixties and early 
seventies did China raise questions concerning their ownership.  Japan thus asserts 
that it has effectively exerted its sovereignty over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands for 
over a century, and therefore should have title to them. 
Additionally, Japan may point out that although it renounced “all right, title and 
claim to Formosa and the Pescadores” in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty,70 
that treaty did not specifically mention or include the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.  
That treaty also did not name any party as the recipient of these former territories.  
Rather, Article 4(b) of the San Francisco Peace Treaty recognizes the “validity of 
dispositions of property of Japan and Japanese nationals pursuant to directives of 
the United States Military Government in any of the areas referred to in Articles 2 
and 3.”  Japan may thus allege that if the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were covered by 
the San Francisco Peace Treaty then, under the same treaty, only the United States 
can legally transfer title to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.  This would lead to two 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 122. 
 66. Id. at 130-31. 
 67. San Francisco Peace Treaty, supra note 57, art. 3. 
 68. See Dzurek, supra note 7. 
 69. See Seokwoo Lee, Continuing Relevance of Traditional Modes of Territorial Acquisition in 
International Law and a Modest Proposal, 16 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1, 13 (2000). 
 70. San Francisco Peace Treaty, supra note 57. 
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potential arguments.  First, Japan may allege that the United States transferred the 
Diaoyu/Senakaku Islands along with the Okinawan Islands.  Second, if the United 
States did not transfer the islands along with the Okinawan Islands, it also did not 
include it with any other territory, and in place of such ambiguity, other legal 
theories such as prescription should be applied. 
In summary, Japan bases its claim to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands primarily on 
the basis that it has exercised control over the islands, through various acts, for 
over a century.  Drawn from these collective acts are four arguments.  First, Japan 
legally declared the islands a part of its own territory after concluding that they 
were terra nullius.  Secondly, because Japan legally possessed the islands, and 
considered the islands a part of Japan, and not Taiwan, they were not ceded to 
Japan per the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki.  Thus, the 1951 San Francisco Peace 
Treaty did not mandate their return at the end of World War II.  Third, Japan has 
exercised sovereignty over the islands for such a long period of time that it is now 
their legal sovereign territory.  Fourth, the San Francisco Peace Treaty did not 
specifically include the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, and did not name any recipient 
for Japan’s relinquished territories.  The San Francisco Peace Treaty gave the 
United States legally binding authority to dispense with the islands, and the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were either included with Okinawa when the United 
States transferred it to Japanese control or the islands were never transferred to any 
country, necessitating the application of legal theories such as prescription. 
IV.  Modern International Case Law 
Modern international case law may serve to determine the merits of Chinese 
and Japanese claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.  In the modern era, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has been used to resolve civil disputes between 
nations.  The court has used past resolutions of territorial disputes in its own 
rulings, and its decisions reflect prevailing international law.  If the United Nations 
were to resolve any such territorial dispute, it may likely refer to case law 
established under the ICJ.  Although neither China nor Japan may likely resort to 
the ICJ, case law may influence how each country chooses to resolve the matter. 
There are six particular cases that shed light on how the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands dispute would be resolved under international law. 
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A.  Island of Palmas Case (United States v. The Netherlands)71 
Island of Palmas is the seminal case regarding island territory disputes.  It 
involved an island off the coast of the Philippines, which was first discovered by 
Spain.  The United States based its claim to the island on two grounds:  prior 
discovery and contiguity (a claim to land based on its proximity to another 
territory).  The island was originally discovered by Spain in the sixteenth century, 
an era during which discovery of land that was terra nullius often conferred title.72  
Since Spain discovered the island, it possessed title.  Title was then passed on to 
the United States, along with the Philippines, following Spain’s defeat in the 
Spanish-American War.  The Netherlands, however, based its claim to the island 
on systemic and continued assertion of authority over the island.  The Netherlands 
claimed that the island was a tributary of native princes, who were also vassals of 
the government of the Netherlands in Indonesia, its colonial possession.  Both 
countries submitted its case to an arbitrator. 
The arbitrator ruled in favor of the Netherlands. The United States was found to 
have gained inchoate title to the island from Spain’s discovery.  Despite this 
however, discovery alone without any accompanying acts that display sovereignty 
provides a weak basis for title.  The arbitrator ruled that inchoate title from 
discovery does not prevail in the face of another country’s peaceful and continuous 
display of sovereignty.73  In this case, neither Spain nor any other country 
contested the exercise of territorial rights by the Netherlands from 1700 to 1906.  
Furthermore, the arbitrator found no basis in international law for the United 
States’ claim based on contiguity.  The Island of Palmas case set forth the rule that 
peaceful and continuous displays of authority provide a stronger basis for title than 
mere discovery alone. 
B.  Clipperton Island Case74 
The Clipperton Island Case involved a dispute between France and Mexico 
over an uninhabited island lying approximately 670 miles off the southwest coast 
of Mexico.75  France claimed the island based upon a French naval officer sailing 
to the island in 1858, making detailed notes of it, and landing a few of his crewmen 
 
 71. Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R. Int’l Arb. Awards 829 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928). 
 72. See id. at 837. 
 73. See id. at 845-46. 
 74. Sovereignty Over Clipperton Island (Mex. v. Fr.), 2 R. Int’l Arb. Awards 1105, 26 A.J.I.L. 
390 (1931). 
 75. See id. 
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on it.  This officer then notified French and Hawaiian officials regarding his 
discovery, and published a declaration of French sovereignty in a Honolulu 
journal.76  France undertook no other action until 1897 when it protested to the 
United States about the presence of three Americans on the island.  In 1898, the 
United States responded by disavowing any claims to the island.  In 1897, 
however, Mexico sent a gunboat to the island, claiming that it possessed title since 
Spanish colonial times due to Spanish discovery.77  Mexico held that French claims 
from 1858 to 1897 were ineffective, and that the island was terra nullius in 1897.  
Both sides eventually submitted to arbitration in 1909. 
The arbitrator ruled that Spanish discovery had not been proven, and thus the 
island was capable of appropriation in 1858.  Based on this date, Mexico only 
showed an interest and laid claim to the island in 1897.78  Although it claimed to 
possess title much earlier, it had previously ignored French claims to the island 
dating back to 1858. Furthermore, effective and exclusive authority, shown by the 
establishment of an administration that can secure the sovereign’s rights, need not 
be required in the case of uninhabited territory.79 
The Clipperton Island case laid out a more specific framework regarding island 
disputes while still adhering to the Island of Palmas rule.  First, a country claiming 
title to an island must actively challenge other hostile claims.  Mexico did not do 
this when France declared title to the island in 1858.  Secondly, reflecting the 
Island of Palmas case, active displays of sovereignty are given greater weight than 
mere declarations of prior possession of title.80  Again, although Mexico claimed 
that the island was its territory since Spanish colonial times, it made no active 
representation of its sovereignty until 1897. 
C.  Minquiers and Ecrehos Case81 
The Minquiers and Ecrehos case involved a dispute between France and the 
United Kingdom regarding two groups of islands situated in the English Channel.82  
In formulating its ruling, the International Court of Justice made two distinctions.  
First, both countries substantiated the bulk of their claims with evidence of prior 
possession, dating to the Norman Conquest of England of 1066.  The Court, 
 
 76. See id. 
 77. See id. 
 78. See id. at 393. 
 79. See id. at 394. 
 80. See Sovereignty Over Senkaku, supra note 59. 
 81. Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (Fr. v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17). 
 82. Id. 
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however, found such ancient evidence both inconclusive and unimportant, and 
subsequently gave little weight to such evidence.83  It instead focused its attention 
upon more recent displays of sovereignty through possession, stating that what was 
determinative was “not indirect presumptions deduced from events in the Middle 
Ages, but evidence which relates directly to the possession of the Ecrehos and 
Minquiers groups.”84  The United Kingdom substantiated its claims to the islands 
by presenting evidence that its courts exerted jurisdiction over the islands.  It 
showed that in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, its courts on the island of 
Jersey exercised jurisdiction over criminal matters, as well as the collection of 
taxes and deeds over the islets.85  Officials from the nearby island of Jersey also 
visited the island of Ecrehos to build maritime facilities, collect census data, and so 
forth.  Because of its effective displays of sovereignty, the Court awarded the islets 
to the United Kingdom.86  Claims of ancient title were of little determinative value.  
In line with the previous two cases, the International Court of Justice reiterated the 
importance of possession reflected by actual displays of continued and peaceful 
sovereignty. 
D.  Case Concerning Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute  
(El Salvador/Honduras; Nicaragua Intervening)87 
The Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute case involved a dispute 
between El Salvador and Honduras regarding specific boundaries between the two 
countries and a few uninhabited islands lying near the borders of El Salvador, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua.88  The region was formerly ruled by Spain as a colonial 
territory, and achieved independence in 1821 with the birth of the Federal Republic 
of Central America.  Arising from the former Republic’s disintegration in 1839 
was Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica.89  There was 
no terra nullius territory involved, because each of the countries inherited their 
 
 83. Id. at 56-57.  The court did not regard ancient claims with high regard.  It noted that even if 
France once had ancient title, “[t]o revive its legal force today by attributing legal effects to 
it after an interval of more than seven centuries seems to lead far beyond any reasonable 
application of legal considerations.” 
 84. Id. at 57. 
 85. See id. at 65-66. 
 86. Id. at 67. 
 87. Land, Island and Maritime Frontier (El Sal. v. Hond), 1992  I.C.J. 351 (Sept. 11), available 
at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/ish/ish_ijudgments/ish_ijudgment_19920911.pdf. 
 88. Id. at 356.  The dispute involved the delineation of boundaries that reflected those set 
during the days of the Spanish Empire. 
 89. Id. at 380-81. 
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claims and territory from the Spanish Empire.90  The International Court of Justice 
turned its attention to specific acts that would constitute an exercise of sovereignty, 
and most importantly, whether a country acquiesced to such acts.91  The Court 
accordingly awarded one island to Honduras because it occupied the island for 
over a century; a period during which El Salvador voiced no opposition.  The 
Court then awarded two other islands to El Salvador because of the country’s 
occupation and control over them, as well as Honduras’ lack of effective 
opposition to such acts.  In line with past case law reflected in the Island of Palmas 
case, the Court focused on displays of actual authority, such as actual occupation 
and effective control.  Quoting from the Island of Palmas case, the Court reiterated 
that “continuous and peaceful display of territorial sovereignty (peaceful in relation 
to other states) is as good as title.”92  In reaching its decisions, the Court relied 
upon occupation, coupled with acts constituting acquiescence93—whether a 
country with a competing claim expressly or impliedly acquiesced to another 
country’s hostile claim. 
E.  Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia)94 
In the dispute over Kasikili/Sedudu Island, Botswana’s claim centered on the 
interpretation of an 1890 treaty signed by Botswana’s and Namibia’s colonial 
predecessors, Germany and Britain.  Namibia, however, asserted the theory of 
prescription to underlie its case, and set forth four criteria that must be fulfilled for 
possession to mature into prescriptive title.95  First, the possession must be 
exercised as a function of state authority.  Second, the possession must be peaceful 
and uninterrupted.  Third, such a claim must be public.  Fourth, the possession 
must endure for a specified period of time.  Namibia argued that it held 
prescriptive title to the disputed territory through the control and use of the islands 
by the Masubia tribes.96  Namibia asserted that the Masubia occupied the island 
unopposed for agricultural purposes.97 
Closely scrutinizing the acts of the Masubia, the Court rejected Namibia’s 
 
 90. Id. at 564. 
 91. Id. at 567-78. 
 92. Land, Island and Maritime Frontier, 1992 I.C.J. at 563. 
 93. Id. at 566. 
 94. Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. 1045 (Dec. 13) reprinted in 39 I.L.M. 
310 (2000), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ibona/ibonaJudgments/ibonaijudgment19991213.htm. 
 95. Id. at 347-48. 
 96. Id. at 349. 
 97. Id. at 350. 
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prescriptive claim.  Although the Masubia used the island for a long period of time, 
and were unopposed by Botswana, their private acts could not be used to general 
title.  The Court held that the Masubia used the island in a private capacity, and 
that they did not exercise the functions of state authority on behalf of such 
authorities.  Thus, because the government of Namibia was not involved in 
sanctioning such private activities, its claim based on prescription failed.98 
F.  Concerning Sovereignty Over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan  
(Indonesia/Malaysia)99 
The case Concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan 
involved the issue of sovereignty over two islands, Ligitan and Sipidan, between 
Indonesia and Malaysia.  Among the various arguments made, both countries 
argued that they held title to the islands based upon different interpretations of a 
colonial convention between Great Britain and the Netherlands.100  The Court 
determined that the prior convention did not create an allocation line determining 
sovereignty over the islands,101 and further held that neither country obtained title 
by succession from its successor.102 
The Court then considered whether Indonesia or Malaysia could hold title 
through activities evidencing actual, continued exercise of authority over the 
islands (effectivités).  Indonesia produced evidence that the waters around the 
islands were traditionally used by its fishermen.103 Similar to how it treated 
Namibia’s evidence of traditional use by the Masubia in the Case Concerning 
Kasilkili/Sedudu Island,104 the Court stated “activities by private persons cannot be 
seen as effectivités if they do not take place on the basis of official regulations or 
under government authority.”105  In contrast, Malaysia cited evidence of official 
acts authorized by local government authorities.  First, Malaysia showed that North 
Borneo authorities took measures to regulate significant economic activity on the 
two islands, specifically the trade and collection of turtle eggs.  It pointed to the 
exercise of effective administration over the islands, in the form of the Turtle 
Preservation Ordinance of 1917, which was applied up until the 1950s.106  
 
 98. Id. 
 99. Sovereignty Over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon. v. Malay.), 2002 I.C.J. 102 
(Dec. 17), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iinma/iinmajudgment/iinma_ijudgment_20021217.PDF. 
 100. Id. at paras. 32-33 
 101. Id. at para. 52. 
 102. Id. at paras. 94, 96,124. 
 103. Id. at para. 130. 
 104. Id. at para. 71. 
 105. Id. at para. 140. 
 106. Id. at paras. 132, 143. 
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Additionally, Malaysia showed that the authorities of the colony of North Borneo 
constructed two lighthouses: one on Sipadan in 1962 and another on Ligitan in 
1963.  Both of these lighthouses are still maintained by the government of 
Malaysia.107  The Court ultimately ruled in favor of Malaysia, holding that 
although such activities  
“are modest in number . . . they are diverse in character and include legislative, 
administrative and quasi-judicial acts.  They cover a considerable period of time and show 
a pattern revealing an intention to exercise State functions in respect of the two islands in 
the context of the administration of a wider range of islands.”108 
Additionally, the Court noted “at the time when these activities were carried out, 
neither Indonesia nor its predecessor, the Netherlands, ever expressed its 
disagreement or protest.”109 
In reaching its decision, the Court focused upon two significant factors.  First, 
in rejecting Indonesia’s use of private acts to justify title, the Court reiterated a 
point made earlier in Kasikili/Sedudu Island that private acts must be rooted in 
official acts or government authority to support a prescriptive title.  Secondly, in 
ruling for Malaysia, the Court focused on qualitative rather than quantitative 
differences.  Even a “modest” number of acts may grant title if such acts are 
diverse in scope (legislative, administrative, judicial, etc.), cover a considerably 
long period of time, and reveal an intention to exercise sovereignty over the 
disputed territory.  Of note, the Court will pay attention to whether the disputing 
party ever expressed disagreement or protest during the relevant period of time. 
V.  Summary of Modern Case Law 
Under modern case law concerning island territorial disputes, five basic points 
emerge.  First, inchoate title, such as gained through discovery, does not confer an 
absolute title.  The discovery of land that is terra nullius provides only a weak 
claim of title.  Second, a state with inchoate title must substantiate its claim by the 
exercise of effective control grounded in peaceful and continuous sovereignty.  
Third, a state must protest any hostile claim to its territory, or risk this being taken 
as implied acquiescence to another state’s claim.  Fourth, ancient claims of title are 
likely to be viewed with some degree of skepticism when they are not backed by 
acts evidencing long periods of continuous and peaceful sovereignty.  Fifth, the 
acts of private parties may not generate prescriptive title if they are not carried out 
with state authority.  It is under these five points that Chinese and Japanese claims 
 
 107. Id. at paras. 132, 143, 146. 
 108. Id. at para. 148. 
 109. Id. 
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would most likely be interpreted. 
VI.  Status of the Islands Under International Law 
A.  Chinese Claims 
China’s claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands may be divided into two 
approaches: one which relies upon historical discovery and prior use, and another 
which focuses upon the status of the islands after World War II according to 
various treaties.  Its first approach, based upon historical discovery and prior use, is 
weak in light of modern international law and the skepticism inherent in upholding 
old historical claims—particularly claims which stretch back several centuries.110  
Historical claims regarding the use of the islands as a navigational guide during the 
Ming dynasty and occasional use by fishermen are not evidence of effective 
control.111  Occasional private use by fisherman also does not evidence the 
involvement of state authority.  Likewise, Qing dynasty use of the islands is 
sporadic.  The islands were used to gather medicinal plants, and were conferred by 
the Qing government to an individual.112  Any private individual acts may be 
grounded in such an act expressing state authority.  Evidence that the islands were 
not featured on Japanese maps as a part of Japan is helpful to China’s case, though 
such evidence is not entirely conclusive.113  At best, historical evidence may prove 
that China had a preexisting claim to the islands; they do not, however, show 
continuous and peaceful displays of sovereignty. 
Historical evidence does not show that China exerted continuous control of the 
islands by objecting to hostile claims.  The Qing government did not protest 
Japanese official surveys of the islands around 1885, or a Japanese cabinet 
decision in 1895 to erect markers on the islands in order to incorporate them into 
Japan.114 Although historical evidence clearly shows China did consider the islands 
a part of its territory, such evidence fails to show that it exercised continuous 
control because China failed to protest Japan’s hostile claims.  By grounding its 
claims in historical discovery, China relies on a traditional rule of international law 
that has largely been unrecognized in the twentieth century.115  As is reflected in 
 
 110. See Minquiers and Ecrehos (Fr. v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17). 
 111. See SUGANAMU, supra note 2, at 45-63, 74-81; see also Dzurek, supra note 7; Cheng-China 
Huang, supra note 48. 
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 113. See SUGANAMU, supra note 2, at 89, 99. 
 114. See Sovereignty Over Senkaku, supra note 59. 
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the Minquiers and Ecrehos case, modern international law regarding island 
territorial disputes focuses upon the continuous effective exercise of authority.  
Even if China can establish discovery, its title is inchoate because its historical 
case is grounded upon various intermittent and isolated cases of use, which, taken 
together, do not constitute continuous effective control. 
China’s second approach seeks to show that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were 
returned to it after World War II.  In 1895 the Sino–Japanese War was concluded 
with the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki; the treaty ceded the island of 
Taiwan and its appurtenant islands to Japan.116  China’s historical claims may be 
enough to prove that the islands were not terra nullius.  Likewise, China may make 
a case that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were appurtenant to Taiwan and should 
have been returned to it because of both the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 
and the 1952 Treaty of Peace signed between the Republic of China and Japan.  
Overall, China’s strongest claim would be that the islands were ceded as a part of 
Taiwan to Japan, and should have been returned to it. 
B.  Japanese Claims 
In contrast to Chinese claims, Japan rests its case for the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands on more recent events.  First, Japan can claim that it incorporated the 
islands into Japanese territory as part of the Nansei Shoto Islands before the 1895 
Treaty of Shimonoseki.117  This would prove that the islands were not considered a 
part of Taiwan, and, thus, they were not required to be handed back to China after 
World War II.  This claim however, is not uncontested, in light of evidence 
supporting China’s historical claims to the islands.  The fact that China did not 
object to various Japanese activities, such as official surveys of the islands, and a 
Japanese cabinet decision to erect markers on the islands, does not mean China 
fully acquiesced to Japan’s claims. 
Japan’s strongest claim is that the islands belong to it by the theory of 
prescription.  Japan’s claim, in contrast to China’s historical discovery claim, may 
be grounded in modern international law.  Japan can show that it has exercised 
effective continuous authority over the islands for over a century.  This claim 
begins at the very least in 1895, and is independent of whether Japan gained the 
islands on its own or through the Treaty of Shimonoseki.  Japan can also show acts 
which evidence early instances of control, such as commercial activities on the 
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islands by Tatsuhiro Koga beginning in 1896 lasting until World War II began.118 
In line with Kasikili/Sedudu Island and Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau 
Sipadan, such private acts involved and were carried out under the authorization of 
Japan and the United States Military. 
Article 4(b) of the San Francisco Treaty gave the United States legal binding 
authority to dispense with the islands.119  Japan may argue that the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were included with Okinawa when the United States 
transferred it to Japanese control.  Even if they were not, they were never expressly 
handed over to any government, and Japan may argue that various acts prior to and 
during World War II, such as land surveys and investigations, also constitute acts 
of authority over the islands.120  After World War II, the islands were administered 
by the United States as part of Okinawa under the provisional government of 
Japan.121  In 1971, the United States transferred the islands to Japan.122  Japan has 
since then exclusively exercised sovereignty over the islands.  Japan’s strongest 
claim is that these various acts, stretching from at least 1895 until today, 
collectively show that Japan has exercised continuous effective control over the 
islands. 
C.  Chinese and Japanese Claims Contrasted Under International Law 
When contrasted with one another under international law, various common 
issues emerge from China’s claims and Japan’s claims.  Neither China nor Japan 
disputes the fact that Japan exercised control of the islands since 1895.  The main 
differences in their claims lie in whether or not the islands were terra nullius prior 
to 1895, as Japan claims, or a part of Chinese territory, as China claims.  They also 
differ in whether or not the islands were ceded to Japan via the 1895 Treaty of 
Shimonoseki.  If they were, they may have been required to be returned to China 
after World War II.  Thus the two countries differ as to the effect of the 1951 San 
Francisco Peace Treaty and the 1952 Peace Treaty signed between the Republic of 
China and Japan. 
China’s claims rest upon two grounds: first, that the islands belong to China via 
historical discovery and prior use, and second, that various treaties require that the 
islands be returned to China.  China’s claims suffer from several weaknesses.  
 
 118. See SUGANAMU, supra note 2, at 96-98, 118-19, 122. 
 119. San Francisco Peace Treaty, supra note 57, at art. 4(b). 
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First, its discovery claim relies upon much older conceptions of international law.  
Modern international law is focused upon the display of continuous effective 
authority.  However, for China, there is a distinct lack of evidence to show 
continuous effective control.  Second, prior to 1895, China did not object to 
Japan’s hostile claims — a fact Japan may use to support its claims that the islands 
were terra nullius.123  China’s strongest point lies in its claim that Japan was 
required by various treaties to return the islands along with Taiwan.  However, it 
may be significant that the People’s Republic of China is not a signatory of either 
the 1951 San Francisco Treaty, or the 1952 Treaty of Peace which was between the 
Republic of China (Taiwan) and Japan.  Additionally, the language of San 
Francisco Peace Treaty in Articles 2, 3, and 4(b) may be interpreted to have 
actually given the United States the power to dispose of Japan’s imperial 
territories.124  Thus, resting a case on the technicalities of treaty language may 
present further problems. 
Japan’s first approach rests upon its claim that the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were 
terra nullius.  Thus, Japan discovered the islands and incorporated them into the 
Nansei Shoto Islands prior to 1895.  This claim, however, competes with Chinese 
historical evidence that proves it had valid title to the islands.  Japan’s strongest 
claim is that it exercised continuous and effective control over the islands for over 
a century via the theory of prescription.  Under this theory, title may have been 
gained by effective occupation and use, where the dispossessed state voices no 
objection to the hostile claim.125  As reflected in the Clipperton Island Case, more 
significant is the fact China did not actively challenge Japan’s hostile claims.  
China did not express any objections about Japan’s actions regarding the islands 
prior to 1895 and during World War II.  After World War II, China did not object 
to the United States’ administration of the islands.  It only objected to Japan’s 
claims after the potential for oil and gas was discovered near the islands in 1968.126  
Furthermore, lack of such objections prior to 1968 may constitute acquiescence to 
Japan’s claims. 
Under modern international law, Japan may have a case for prescriptive title to 
the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.  A series of international cases127 have expressed the 
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general rule that effective control, characterized by acts that constitute continuous 
and peaceful authority, will triumph over inchoate claims of title through 
discovery.  Much of China’s claim rests upon its inchoate title, gained through 
historical discovery.  Yet it has not substantiated its claim through effective, 
continuous and peaceful control over the islands, both before 1895 and after World 
War II.  It also failed to repeatedly protest Japanese claims to the islands before 
1895.  Only when the potential for oil/gas in the vicinity of the islands was 
discovered in the late sixties and early seventies did China raise questions 
concerning their ownership.  Additionally, even if the islands were a part of 
Taiwan and were required to be returned to it, Japan still exercised control over the 
islands while China did not.  Japan has exercised effective control over the islands 
for over a century.  Under the precedents established in modern international law, 
as reflected in the seminal Island of Palmas, Japan has a competent claim to the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. 
D.  Smaller Islands Do Not Generate Full Economic Zones 
The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands possess little intrinsic value in and of themselves.  
Their main value appears to be the extent to which they may generate economic 
zones covering nearby natural resources.128  Under prevailing international law, 
Japan appears to have a slightly stronger claim to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands than 
China.  However, this assessment is tempered by the fact that under modern 
international law, when pitted against continental land masses, smaller islands 
usually do not generate full zones, such as the 200-mile economic zones allotted to 
coasts under UNCLOS III.129 
A string of cases decided by the Court has established that when balanced 
against larger continental landmasses or larger islands, smaller islands usually will 
not be allotted full zones.130  In the Continental Shelf Case of Tunisia and Libya, 
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the Court delimitated the area of continental shelf appertaining to Tunisia and 
Libya in a contested coastal region.  Although the main island of the Kerkennah 
Islands (Tunisia) is 69 square miles and had a population of over 15,000, the Court 
gave only “half-effect” to its ability to generate a full zone in relation to the 
neighboring Libyan mainland.131  Similarly, in the Gulf of Maine between Canada 
and the United States, the Court concluded that it should only give partial effect to 
Canada’s Seal Island.  The Island occupies a commanding position in the entryway 
of the Gulf area disputed by Canada and the United States.  Although “it is some 
two-and-a-half miles long, rises some 50 feet above sea level, and is inhabited all 
the year round,” the Court reasoned that it would be “excessive to consider the 
coastline of [mainland peninsular] Nova Scotia [displaced] . . . by the entire 
distance between Seal Island and that coast. . . .”132  In the Continental Shelf Case 
of Libya and Malta, the Court disregarded the effect of a small uninhabited island 
belonging to Malta, and also gave the main island of Malta only partial effect due 
to its small size in relation to Libya’s longer continental coast.  The Court stated 
that relative landmass was not a factor, and that “[l]andmass has never been 
regarded as a basis of entitlement to continental shelf rights. . . .” 133  Furthermore, 
the Court stated that, “[t]he capacity to engender continental shelf rights derives 
not from landmass, but from sovereignty over the landmass; and it is by means of 
the maritime front of this landmass . . . that this territorial sovereignty brings its 
continental shelf rights into effect.”134  In line with this reasoning, the Court did 
not take into consideration Malta’s Filfla Island in delimitation, reasoning that such 
a small island should not have a disproportionate effect on limiting the extent of 
the much broader Libyan coast.135  In addition, the Court also limited the extent of 
Malta’s main island in delimitating the median line between Malta and Libya.  The 
Court took into consideration the relative disparity between the lengths of Malta’s 
coast in comparison to Libya’s longer coast and determined that “there is a 
considerable disparity between their lengths, to a degree which . . . constitutes a 
relevant circumstance which should be reflected in the drawing of the delimitation 
line.”136  The Court concluded that this circumstance warranted an adjustment of 
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the median line to attribute a greater area of shelf to Libya.137  Generally, the Court 
seemed to believe that smaller coastal areas do not have the ability to generate full 
or extensive maritime zones when pitted against landmasses with broader coastal 
lengths.  The Court in Greenland and Jan Mayen138 reached a similar conclusion 
with respect to the limited zone generating ability of smaller islands.  The large 
disparity regarding the length of coast between the smaller Jan Mayan Island and 
the long coast of Greenland led the court to give Jan Mayan a reduced zone.139 
Although Japan may possess a slightly stronger claim to the Diaoyu/Senakaku 
Islands under modern international law, the potential for exploiting the value of the 
islands may be substantially limited by other international cases that curtail the 
extent to which smaller islands generate full economic zones.  In the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku territorial dispute between China and Japan, both countries must 
take into consideration relative gains and losses.  However, the relative gains may 
lose much of their appeal to whichever party the islands will be awarded if its 
economic zones become substantially curtailed.  Although Japan’s claim may rest 
on firmer ground, it may nonetheless be prudent for it to consider alternative 
resolutions to the dispute. 
VII.  China and the ASEAN Approach  
Many of the problems that plague the Sino–Japanese relationship are reflected 
in China’s relations with the ASEAN countries.  In particular, China has had a 
number of territorial disputes with various ASEAN countries over a number of 
islands in the South China Sea.140  While China has insisted in the past that it 
wished to resolve such problems on a bilateral country-to-country basis, in recent 
years it has moved to work with ASEAN multilaterally.  This approach culminated 
in the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, a 
multilateral agreement signed by eleven countries (hereinafter Declaration).141  
The Declaration, although non-binding, declared that each country would avoid 
activities that would raise tension in the area. 
A.  ASEAN 
The interests and machinations of several large powers come together in East 
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Asia.  The influence of the United States, China, Japan, India, and Russia converge 
in Asia, much to the worry of the smaller Southeast Asian countries.  To address 
the potential for conflict, whether economic or military, the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was created in 1967.142  The goals of ASEAN 
are delineated in the 1967 Bangkok Declaration.  Among its objectives are goals to 
promote economic, social and cultural development, and stability, to provide a 
forum for regional dispute resolution, and, in general, to promote greater dialogue 
in the region.143 
ASEAN has steadily grown in importance and scope.  In November of 2004, 
ASEAN proposed the creation of an East Asian Community.144  ASEAN has 
steadily been enlarging the scope of its activities; since 1999 it has hosted its 
annual meetings alongside three other countries: China, Japan, and South Korea.  
These ASEAN+3 meetings have promoted greater dialogue on economic and 
regional security issues.  Some experts believe the move to create a greater East 
Asian Community coincides with increased tensions in the region, particularly in 
the Korean Peninsula and between China and Japan.145  It is hypothesized that this 
trend towards greater economic cooperation and integration is a major reason 
behind the move towards an East Asian Community.146  Notwithstanding the 
United Nations’ activities and given ASEAN’s current and future role, it would be 
a potential forum or model for potential dispute resolution between China and 
Japan. 
B.  The Spratly Islands and China’s Claim 
Of all the territorial problems confronting the nations of Southeast Asia, 
perhaps one of the most complicated involves the Spratly Islands.  The Spratly 
Islands are located in the South China Sea and are located more than 500 miles 
southwest of China.147  The island chain is composed of more than 500 islands, 
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islets, and rocks, stretching some 500 miles north to south, and 400 miles east to 
west.148  The islands themselves are uninhabited, and only occasionally used by 
fishermen.  Possession of the islands however, confers a large swath of territorial 
sea, and would extend the Exclusive Economic Zone of the owner into the 
expansive South China Sea.  Furthermore, large oil/gas reserves are believed to lie 
underneath the large area that the Spratly Islands cover. 
Sovereignty over the Spratly Islands is contested by several countries.  China 
occupies several outposts and eight islands; Vietnam is thought to occupy nineteen 
islands; the Philippines occupies eight islands; Malaysia occupies four islands; and 
Taiwan occupies the largest island, Taiping Island.  In addition, Brunei claims 
some of the islands as its territory.149  China has had numerous disputes with the 
Philippines over the islands.  In particular, however, China’s disputes with 
Vietnam have resulted in armed conflict on four occasions.150 
China lays claim to all of the Spratly Islands.  Its claims are based upon 
historical discovery.  China claims it discovered the islands at the time of the Han 
dynasty, and that since then, Chinese have settled and developed the islands.151  
This claim, however, has been criticized by some scholars who instead propose 
that Chinese discovery occurred during the Yuan dynasty.152  China nevertheless 
contends that China has maintained a continuous presence on the island chain, and 
since Ming and Qing times its Qiongzhou Prefecture exercised jurisdiction over 
the islands.153  China’s claim, however, is mainly substantiated by the fact that 
Chinese fishermen periodically used the islands as shelter, to fish, and to collect 
natural resources.154 
China’s claim to the Spratly Islands has been subject to scrutiny under 
international law.  In particular, Island of Palmas and Clipperton Island have been 
used to challenge China’s case.  Vietnam has challenged China’s claims—stating 
that even if the Chinese had discovered the islands first, China has failed to prove 
it ever established effective, continuous, and peaceful control over the islands.155  
China’s claims extend into the EEZ and continental shelf of Indonesia as well as 
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Vietnam.  However, many of the countries involved, particularly Brunei and 
Vietnam, base their claims on UNCLOS III’s156 continental shelf principle.157  In 
the case of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, China partly bases its claim on the same 
continental shelf principle.  Application of this principle would produce several 
different results in the case of the Diaoyu/Senkaku and the Spratly Islands. 
China’s claim to the Spratly Islands is subject to modern international law, as 
are its claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.  Primarily its claims are grounded to 
a substantial degree on older notions of international law, such as title by 
discovery.  Such reliance weakens China’s case.  Unlike with Japan however, 
China has taken a different course of action with regards to its claims on the 
Spratly Islands. 
C.  2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea158 
The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea was 
concluded by the ten ASEAN nations and China on November 2, 2002.  Although 
not binding on the parties, it set forth a framework for conflict resolution through 
dialogue and peaceful means.159  It commits its parties to refrain from contentious 
acts but allows them to undertake various other actions, such as marine research.160 
Since the Declaration was created in 2002, some view tensions in Southeast 
Asia as having decreased.  However, recent events raise questions regarding the 
effectiveness of the agreement.  The Philippines held military exercises with the 
United States near the islands.  Vietnam has ferried several tourists to some of the 
islands, provoking fears that Vietnam will soon use the islands as a tourist 
destination.  Several Taiwanese individuals have built a “bird-watching” structure 
on one of the islands.  Additionally, China has sent several research and military 
ships there.161  Despite these problems, the Declaration has generally functioned to 
modify the behavior of the various countries.  They now act with greater restraint 
and generally adhere to the declaration, cooperate with each other, and promote 
greater dialogue.162  Although these countries have not given up their claims, the 
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Declaration has provided a communal basis for mutual cooperation by pushing 
aside the direct question of sovereignty. 
In the years following the agreement, several countries entered into regional 
joint projects.  In September of 2004, the Philippines and China agreed to jointly 
study oil deposits in the South China Sea.163  Additionally, the national oil 
companies of China, the Philippines, and Vietnam have agreed to conduct three 
years of joint exploratory research in a disputed Spratly area that all three countries 
claim.164  These cooperative projects call for multiparty exploration and each 
country seems to have shelved the issue of territorial sovereignty, perhaps evincing 
a greater interest in economic exploitation of the area’s natural resources.  
Although the ultimate issue of sovereignty has not been addressed, these 
interregional projects may intertwine the domestic interests of the countries 
involved and ultimately decrease regional tensions by providing a common starting 
point for agreement. 
VIII.  Resolution and Conclusion 
A.  Political and Economic Realities Call for Greater Mutual Cooperation 
Any possible resolution regarding the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands must take into 
consideration the contentious political and economic issues that lie at the heart of 
current Sino–Japanese relations.  Considering that China’s claims to the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands appear to be weaker than Japan’s claims under 
international law, China has reason to promote mutual cooperation.  
Notwithstanding Japan’s stronger claim under international law, it too has a lot to 
gain in political and economic capital from mutual cooperation. 
A focus on the growth and strength of bilateral economic ties should ground the 
framework of mutual cooperation.  In this regard, Japan should view the island 
dispute as an opportunity to create greater interdependence between the two 
countries.  China should also reiterate its proposal for mutual cooperation for 
exploration of the East China Sea.165  As it stands many believe that if tensions 
were reduced, the two countries’ already strong economic ties would continue to 
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grow.166  Because both countries are so dependent on oil imports, the oil issue 
should serve as a basis for mutual cooperation.  Some Japanese and Chinese 
observers believe that a more united position in regards to their energy concerns 
would be a win–win situation.167  Japan should also take a more conciliatory 
position in the oil dispute between the two countries since there are problems 
regarding development of the resources near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.  Because 
of the high expenses involved in liquefaction of natural gas and its transportation, 
the Japan Petroleum Development Association has concluded that it is more 
realistic to sell any gas to China because it is closer to the gas fields than Japan.168  
Additionally, even if the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands were conferred to Japan, there is 
a possibility that the economic zone of the islands would be limited.  Thus 
possessing the islands may not allow Japan to exploit the valuable natural 
resources in adjoining areas.169 
As reflected in concerns over China’s increasing military role, and the 
corresponding possible threat stemming from their interest in the East China Sea 
and Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, it is perhaps prudent for Japan to seek alternative 
avenues of cooperation.170  A leading Japanese expert in the Council on Foreign 
Relations has concluded that: “[f]rom Japan’s perspective, funding for pipelines 
inside China or [an] international co-development scheme for the Spratly or 
Senkaku Islands increase[s] interdependence and decrease[s] the prospects that 
China will embark on a dangerous program of naval modernization to protect sea 
lanes of communication that are so vital to Japan.”171 
Politically ties between China and Japan have been exacerbated by what  
China perceives as insensitivity regarding Japan’s invasion of China during World 
War II.  Visits to the Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese leaders and other matters 
related to World War II have virtually controlled the development of bilateral 
political relations.172  Japan also has increasingly viewed China as a threat, and 
domestic opinion regarding China has likewise turned increasingly negative.  
However both countries should pay deference to the 1978 Treaty of Peace and 
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Friendship which, among other things, committed the two countries to the 
establishment of relations based on five principles:  (1) principles of mutual respect 
for sovereignty and territorial integrality; (2) principles of mutual nonaggression; 
(3) principles of noninterference in each other’s internal affairs; (4) principles of 
equality and mutual benefit; and (5) principles of peaceful coexistence.173  In 
keeping with this, both countries should work to forge a mutually beneficial 
relationship—confined not simply to a hot economic relationship, but they should 
also forge a warm political relationship based upon cooperation. 
B.  Conclusion: ASEAN 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties  
as an Example of Cooperation 
It would be prudent for China and Japan to modeling any future bilateral 
agreement along the lines of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the 
South China.  In the spirit of ASEAN (of which both countries are dialogue 
partners) and in the spirit of their 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, such a 
model should be seriously discussed and pursued.  Given the increasing movement 
towards an East Asian Community and the fact that the increasing tensions 
between China and Japan have partly driven this trend, both countries must look to 
alternative means to mollify hazards to their increasingly interdependent 
economies. 
China should have great reason to explore the idea of an agreement with Japan 
regarding the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.  Its claim to the islands relies heavily upon 
older concepts of international law, such as historical discovery.  Even if the 
islands may be regarded as part of Taiwan, which would require their return to 
China via various treaties, China’s position is not safeguarded.  Modern 
international law seems to favor Japan’s claims, since Japan has exercised effective 
control of the islands for more than a century.  Furthermore, the United Nations 
has said it will decide on global offshore territorial claims by May 2009.  Given 
these facts, it would be advantageous for China to secure as great an interest in the 
islands as it can through a mutually cooperative agreement with Japan.  Likewise, 
given Japan’s dependence upon China economically and its frigid political ties 
with China, it may be advantageous to Japan to provide some leeway in regards to 
the issue even if its claims are more favorable under international law.  Japan’s 
business community favors greater rapprochement, fearing that cold political ties 
will narrow the scope of Japanese business dealings with China; they also fear that 
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the cold political trend will eventually dampen economic relations.174 
The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, despite 
its potential shortcomings, has decreased the level of tension between China and 
the ASEAN nations.  It has acted as a restraint on how the various countries deal 
with one another regarding their conflicting claims, and it has also provided a basis 
for mutual exploration and cooperation.  As of now, China and Japan do not 
possess any other method for cooperation despite record bilateral trade in 2005.175  
The ambiguity inherent in an ASEAN–modeled declaration would allow for a 
great degree of flexibility.  First, it would placate extreme domestic nationalism by 
not explicitly relinquishing sovereign claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.  
Second, the main value of the islands seem to lie in their access to nearby natural 
resources,176 and any such agreement creates room for bilateral cooperation 
revolving around joint-exploitation of such resources—much like what has 
occurred with respect to China, the Philippines, and Vietnam.177  Third, joint 
projects entered into under such an ASEAN–modeled declaration may allow a 
country to exploit the resources of the area even if the same country is not forced 
to relinquish its claim on the islands.  Ultimately, a bilateral agreement between 
the two countries, which commits both parties to cooperation and avoidance of 
tension raising acts, would provide a basis for future political rapprochement and 
better economic ties. 
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